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ABSTRACT (Words 150)  
This study aimed to investigate why there is variability in taking blood. 
A multi method Pilot study was completed in four National Health Service 
Scotland hospitals. Human Factors/Ergonomics principles were applied to 
analyse data from 50 observations, 15 interviews and 12-months of incident 
data from all Scottish hospitals. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) was used to understand why variability may influence blood sampling 
functions.  
The analysis of the 61 pre blood transfusion sampling incidents highlighted 
limitations in the data collected to understand factors influencing performance. 
FRAM highlighted how variability in the sequence of blood sampling functions 
and the number of practitioners involved in a single blood sampling activity was 
influenced by the working environment, equipment, clinical context, work 
demands and staff resources.  
This pilot study proposes a realistic view of why blood sampling activities vary 
and proposes the need to consider the system’s resilience in future safety 
management strategies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In acute hospital care, the hazard of testing the wrong patient’s blood, due to 
inaccuracies in sample labelling or patient identification creates a risk of 
inefficient patient care, patient harm and even death. A wrong blood in tube 
(WBIT) incident will influence the likelihood that a patient efficiently and safely 
receives the required intervention e.g. the transfusion of the correct blood 
component [1]. International evidence cited for WBIT incidents is between 1 in 
every 1,500 – 3,000 of blood samples taken [2,3]. In the United Kingdom (UK), 
the Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) organisation is an independent 
haemovigilance scheme providing an annual comprehensive analysis and 
summary of national data associated with transfusion incidents. Currently data 
suggests few cases of major morbidity or death from WBITs, however, the 
potential for harm remains as the WBIT rate continues to rise [1]. In 2012 the 
British Committee for Standards in Haematology [4] requested that unless a 
secure electronic identification system was in place a second sample of the 
patient’s blood should be requested prior to the transfusion of blood 
components. This recommendation is intended to mitigate the risk of harm to 
patients through WBIT incidents, however, it does not address why WBITs occur 
and hence they are likely to continue. 
From a safety science perspective the most obvious questions to ask are how 
and why does blood sampling go wrong? There is, however, an alternative 
question:  how and why does blood sampling usually go right? In 2014 the 
National Health Service (NHS) in Scotland completed 495,094 samples; for 
every 1 WBIT, 7583 samples were successfully processed and reported (Scottish 
National Blood Transfusion Service 2015). Lawton et al (2015) [5] suggests 
healthcare is being encouraged, like other safety industries [6], to shift safety 
management strategies away from solely focusing on error detection and 
incident management (Safety-I approach) [6,7]. Instead a Safety-II strategy is 
proposed as a more proactive approach to understand safety and increase the 
focus on safety interventions to ensure more things go right more often, which 
complements a Safety-I approach [8]. The underlying assumption of Safety-II is 
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that in complex socio-technical systems adjustments to everyday working 
environments and human performance are normal, and are relied upon to 
accommodate uncertainty, fluctuations in demand and organisational 
constraints. Understanding these adjustments and the trade-offs made by the 
healthcare workforce provides a realistic view of how an organisation functions 
and how everyday work is usually done. 
Published literature suggests two core issues impact on blood sampling system 
safety and reliability: patient identification and sample labelling. Formal 
identification of a patient underpins safety in many healthcare interventions; 
however, it may not always occur [9, 10, 11]. Mis-labelling of blood samples is a 
risk which may harm the patient or delay treatment [12, 13, 14]. Evidence 
reports these events but with the exception of one recent study [15] does not 
look to understand why. In addition incident reporting systems presents a biased 
interpretation of data, as reporting does not seek to capture the breadth of 
system related factors which influence human performance and are not 
representative of all types of incidents that happen [1, 16, 17, 18, 19]. 
The aim of this pilot study is to understand why variability in blood sampling 
performance in acute hospital settings can occur. The methods applied were 
informed by Human Factors science, to understand why performance might vary 
and how a Safety-II approach can inform future safety management 
programmes. 
METHOD 
A three-month study at four acute medium – large hospitals in NHS Scotland 
was completed in 2015 involving three clinical areas which reflect those with the 
highest proportion of WBIT incidents [1]: Emergency departments, outpatients, 
and acute wards. 
This study introduced the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), an 
approach specifically developed to model complex systems [20]. FRAM offers a 
systematic approach to describing and examining work as it is done rather than 
imagined and reflects interactions between functions and their potential 
variability.  
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Data collection and Analysis 
The methods used to inform FRAM included observations (n=50) and semi 
structured interviews (n=15), see Table 1. These were supported by two 
workshops with Transfusion Practitioners to develop and verify the findings and 
produce the FRAM model. The methods were completed by two researchers (LP 
& SA). The approach to sampling was pragmatic and convenience sampling was 
necessary based on staffing levels and availability. A limited number of 
observations with medical doctors was possible and this informed the sampling 
process for the interviews completed, which recruited a greater percentage of 
medical staff. One year of pre blood transfusion sampling incident data (n=61), 
from 14 regional health boards (authorities) within Scotland (n= 15), were also 
anonymised and analysed. 
Table 1 Data collection details  
Observations 
Emergency 
Department 
Acute Wards Obstetrics Outpatients 
n=12 n=10 n=5 n=23 
Doctor Healthcare 
Support Worker 
Nurse Phlebotomist 
n=2 n=14 n=21 n=13 
Interviews 
Doctor Healthcare 
Support Worker 
Nurse Phlebotomist 
6 1 6 2 
Total time               = 484 minutes 
Average time          = 40 minutes 30 seconds 
Range in time         = 26 – 58 minutes 
 
Observation Data 
Observations were completed by two of researchers (LP & SA). Fifty observations 
were completed (Doctors n= 2, Healthcare Support Workers n=14, nurses n= 
21, Phlebotomists n= 13) using a standardised observation tool developed 
specifically for the study (see online supplementary appendix A). Permission was 
gained from patients. A Human Factors systems model, the Systems Engineering 
Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model [21], was used to code observations 
and identify factors influencing blood sampling activities, a sample of data was 
double coded by two investigators (LP & SA) to verify and modify the coding 
strategy.  
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Semi structured interviews 
Interview questions (see online supplementary appendix B) were developed 
following a review of the literature, they were tailored to the time available, and 
recorded and transcribed with permission. The analysis of the interview data 
informed FRAM and had two aims [20]: firstly to identify the core functions 
relevant to describe blood sampling activities. This was completed independently 
by three of the authors (LP, SA & EH) and compared to obtain a consensus. 
Secondly the core functions became codes used to thematically analyse the data 
for sources of variability specific to each function. 
Incident data analysis 
Descriptive statistics were completed of the incident data and a content analysis 
using thematic coding [22], was completed by one investigator (LP). Level one 
codes represented the outcome of the incident. Level two codes were based on 
the SEIPS model [21]. As a pilot study the opportunity was taken to explore if 
this form of incident data analysis was practical and contributed to informing 
FRAM. This form of analysis is not essential to FRAM and project resources only 
allowed for one researcher to be allocated to this task. 
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Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
FRAM applied the findings from analysis of interview and observational data to 
describe the functions relevant to the entire blood sampling process. Each 
function was described using up to six aspects (Box 1); the ‘output’ from one 
function was linked as a necessary ‘input’ or ‘precondition’ for a subsequent 
function. A FRAM model was created within a workshop with Transfusion 
Practitioners using a software tool (http://functionalresonance.com/tools-
visualisation/index.html). This explored how the functions interact and which key 
interactions and sources of variability will potentially influence a functions 
‘output’ –either with regard to its timing or quality. 
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Time 
Time influencing or 
constraining how the 
function is completed 
Control 
Artefacts or other 
functions which 
determines or 
regulates how the 
function is completed 
e.g. procedures, 
guidelines 
Output 
The result of the 
function and links to 
functions downstream 
Resources 
That consumed or 
required to complete a 
function e.g. 
manpower, 
competence, software 
Precondition 
System conditions 
that must be fulfilled 
before a function can 
be commenced 
Input 
That which activates 
the function or is used 
or transformed to 
produce the output. 
This is the link to 
upstream functions. 
Box 1 FRAM descriptors and a sample of functions which represent the blood 
sampling process 
8 
 
Analysis of the FRAM model focused on understanding which core functions 
contribute to the success of multiple subsequent functions, and combinations of 
closely dependent functions. The FRAM model provided a visual representation 
that challenged how the clinical teams believed the blood sampling procedures 
were applied to the reality. This verified that the final FRAM model represented 
what does, or potentially could, happen when blood sampling is completed 
rather than perceived to happen as reflected in protocols and guidance. 
FINDINGS 
 
Incident Data Analysis 
Job roles associated with WBIT incidents 
Descriptive statistics of the incident data supported evidence [1] on the 
prevalence of WBIT incidents being greater for Doctors (42%) than Nurses 
(23%), Midwifes (23%) and Phlebotomists (3%). However, without the 
frequency with which each job role takes the relative risk for each professional 
group can't be calculated.  
The data suggests the majority of incidents occurred during normal working 
hours with peaks at around 12.00, and 15.00-16.00 hours, Figure 1. This may 
well reflect when the majority of samples are taken or be linked to other factors 
which may contribute to fatigue [23]. 
WBIT outcomes and influencing factors 
Table 2 summarises the percentage split of the codes attributed to the outcome 
and factors influencing the incident based on the SEIPS model.   
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Figure 1 Time of day of WBIT incidents. 
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Table 2 Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) Model and Incident Data Codes 
SEIPS 
Components 
Selection of Element 
Examples 
Wrong Label Wrong Patient 
Wrong Patient 
Information 
Person Education, skills and 
knowledge, motivation, 
needs, physical 
characteristics,  
9% 32% 25% 
Fatigue, compassion for 
patient 
Alertness, fatigue Fatigue, fake 
patient identity 
Organisation Team work, communication, 
organisational culture and 
patient safety culture, work 
schedules, social 
relationships, supervisory 
and management style  
13% 5% 25% 
Procedure practicality, 
training, team 
communication, staff 
rotation, staff resources  
Procedures – 
practicality, team 
work 
Work schedule 
Technologies 
and tools 
Various information 
technologies: electronic 
health record, medical 
devices. Other technologies 
and tools, human factors 
characteristics e.g. usability 
16% 5% 13% 
Unavailability, usability Usability Usability 
Tasks Variety of tasks, job 
content, challenge and 
utilisation of skills, 
autonomy, job control and 
participation, job demands 
(e.g. workload, time 
pressure, cognitive load, 
need for attention) 
51% 53% 25% 
Job demands, time 
pressure, distractions, 
interruptions, multi-
tasking, similar 
information, information 
presentation, task 
sequence and timing 
 
Job demands, 
distractions, 
workload, similar 
information, need 
for attention, multi-
tasking 
Need for attention 
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Environment Layout, noise, lighting, 
temperature, humidity and 
air quality, workstation 
design. 
9% 5% 13% 
Noise - distractions Noise - distractions Noise - distractions 
Care 
processes 
and other 
processes 
Care processes, other 
processes: information flow, 
purchasing, maintenance, 
cleaning, process 
improvement activities 
2% 0% 0% 
Equipment maintenance 
and repair 
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The data revealed that the greatest number of incidents were associated with an 
outcome of the ‘wrong label’, these were more frequently associated with the 
‘task’ code. This highlighted the challenge posed in the labelling of samples 
created from checking similar information, multi-tasking and time pressure.  
 
Additional contributory factors were: usability of interfaces to select the correct 
patient from a drop down list, the presence of different patient labels in the 
same proximity, unavailability of technical systems, practicality of procedures 
and staffing levels. 
 
FRAM analysis 
A FRAM model was produced including 31 functions representative of blood 
sampling activity. The number of interactions between functions, upstream or 
downstream dependencies, are presented in Table 3 columns 2 and 3. The 
model was used to present two instantiations for blood sampling as observed in 
outpatients and reported on in an emergency situation. Variability typical to 
completing the core functions within these two instantiations were elicited from 
the data, Table 3. Interactions and dependencies between functions highlight 
potential differences in the sequence of functions (Table 3) and how different 
practitioners complete clusters of functions (see online supplementary appendix 
C, each colour illustrates a different practitioner). One blood sample in the 
Outpatients clinic setting typically involved four practitioners and in an acute 
emergency situation potentially three or more.  
13 
 
Table 3 Summary of function outputs and variability in blood sampling functions  
 
Function 
 
Up-
stream 
Influence 
 
Down-
stream 
Influence 
 
Function Output 
 
Variability of Output 
In Outpatients* 
O
u
tp
a
ti
e
n
ts
 
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
**
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
**
  
Variability of Output 
In Emergency* 
 
 
Maintenance 
support 
0 4 IT systems available     
 
Collect relevant 
information 
 
3 5 
 
Clinical information 
Priority of sample 
Patient identity 
 
On time – completed prior clinic 
Acceptable – consultation with 
patient provides information 
2  
 
Omitted – patient identity unknown 
 
 
Produce and 
attach patient 
wristband 
0 3 Wristband     
 
Decide to take a 
blood sample 
 
0 6 
Decision to take blood 
Required samples 
On time – completed prior to 
clinic. Acceptable – accepted as 
appropriate from referring 
Doctor 
1 2 
On time – often one of the first 
interventions. Acceptable –
immediate activity required to 
determine interventions 
 
Assign 
appropriate staff 
 
0 4 Competent staff     
 
Schedule work 
(sampling) 
 
4 3 
Sample collection 
time 
Sampling sequence 
    
 
*These columns illustrate how the timing or accuracy of relevant resources and information may impede, and/or require staff to adjust the sequence or 
performance of the blood sampling functions. The reliability and sequence of the request and labelling of blood sample functions is determined by the clinical 
context and availability of technical resources.  
 
**These columns illustrate the order in which the functions were typically observed during the study. This illustrates variability exists in the sequence of blood 
sampling functions between clinical contexts to obtain a sample.  
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Function 
 
Up-
stream 
Influence 
 
Down-
stream 
Influence 
 
Function Output 
 
Variability of Output 
In Outpatients 
O
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Variability of Output 
In Emergency 
Maintain 
adequate stock 
levels of 
equipment 
0 4 
Request forms 
Equipment available 
Labels, In date tubes 
    
 
Complete 
request process 3 5 
Written request form 
IT system request 
Documentation of 
required samples 
On time – completed prior to 
clinic. Acceptable – as patient 
presents on clinic list requiring 
bloods 
3 6 
Imprecise – inaccuracy of 
completion or selection of details. 
Too late – delayed request for 
temporary identifier  
 
Print labels and 
collect 
4 4 
Labels 
Printed labels 
Printed IT system 
form 
On time –printed local to clinic 
prior to patient arrival. Precise – 
paper clipped to patient case 
notes used to check identity 
4 7 
Too late – labels may be printed 
after blood sampling 
Imprecise – wrong labels printed or 
collected 
 
Check the form / 
requests 
2 4 
 
Documentation of 
required samples 
Patient identity 
 
On time – without check unaware 
of patient identity requiring 
sample 
5 8 
 
Too late – unavailable prior to 
sample taken 
 
Gather blood 
sampling 
equipment 
3 2 
 
Blood sampling 
equipment 
 
On time – prepared prior to clinic 
starting 
7 3 
 
Too late – interrupts or delays the 
sampling process if equipment is 
unavailable 
 
 
Label tube 
 
2 1 Labelled tube     
 
Prepare oneself 
for taking a 
sample 
4 2 
 
Preparations 
completed 
Clean hands, gloves 
 
On time – sink and equipment 
available and accepted norm 
within team 
10  
Omitted –may not be completed - 
time pressure, patient or clinician 
characteristics  
 
Perform 
venepuncture 
5 1 
 
Access to vein 
 
On time – as the resource of 
blood sampling knowledge is 
likely to be high in this context 
11 4 
 
On time – as the resource of blood 
sampling knowledge is likely to be 
high in this context 
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Function 
 
Up-
stream 
Influence 
 
Down-
stream 
Influence 
 
Function Output 
 
Variability of Output 
In Outpatients 
 O
u
tp
a
ti
e
n
ts
 
s
e
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u
e
n
c
e
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
  
Variability of Output 
In Emergency 
 
Locate intended 
patient 
 
4 1 Location of patient 
Acceptable – called from waiting 
room 
6 1 
 
Acceptable 
 
Check identity of 
patient 
4 3 
 
Correctly identified 
patient 
Imprecise – unreliable checking 
wrong patient  
Not at all – familiarity inhibits 
checking. Distraction/interruption  
8  
 
 
Communicate to 
establish identity 
 
0 3 
 
Patient conformance 
Relative conformance 
 
  
 
 
Inform patient 
and consent 
 
2 1 
 
Permission to take 
blood sample 
 
Not at all – assumed consent, 
familiarity with patient 
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Label blood 
sample 
 
7 4 
 
Labelled sample 
 
Imprecise – incorrect minimal ID 
data set attached to sample 
13 9 
 
Imprecise – incorrect minimal 
ID data set attached to sample 
 
Take blood 
samples 
4 1 
 
Blood sample taken 
 
On time - as the resource of 
blood sampling knowledge is 
likely to be high in this context 
12 5 
 
On time - as the resource of 
blood sampling knowledge is 
likely to be high in this context 
 
Cross check 
patient ID to 
request 
4 3 
 
Correctly identified 
patient 
Samples required 
Not at all – check of patient ID 
omitted unintended patient 
Imprecise - unreliable checking 
unintended patient 
  
 
 
Bag samples 
 
 
2 1 
 
Bagged samples 
 
15 11 
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Function 
Up-
stream 
Influence 
Down-
stream 
Influence 
 
Function Output 
 
Variability of Output 
In Outpatients 
 O
u
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n
c
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E
m
e
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e
n
c
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s
e
q
u
e
n
c
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Variability of Output 
In Emergency 
Cross check 
intended patient 
ID on blood 
sample 
3 1 
 
Cross check 
completed 
 
  
 
 
Record samples 
completed 
 
3 0 
 
Documentation 
 
Acceptable – record of samples 
completed 
14 10 
 
 
Send samples to 
lab 
5 1 
 
Sample received 
Not at all – pod system 
malfunctions and may prevent 
samples reaching correct 
destination 
16 12 
Omitted – pod system 
malfunctions and may prevent 
samples reaching correct 
destination 
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Practitioner Resources 
The function ‘Assign appropriate staff’ will influence the ratio between the 
demand for blood samples and the ability for a healthcare system to respond. 
Practitioners suggested this function may compromise later checking functions. 
“I like to double check and make sure I have got the right person…. in this 
situation that you are totally busy that kind of double checking process 
can sometimes go out the window” 
Time pressure contributes to workload, and is a stressor which can negatively 
impact individual performance in tasks that rely upon attention to ensure 
accuracy [24]. Unpredictability in workload and availability of a venepuncturist 
can create real and perceived time pressures. 
Context of Blood Sampling 
The number of practitioners involved to complete a single blood sample varied. 
Instantiations (scenarios) using the FRAM model illustrated two clinical contexts. 
In an emergency, several practitioners may attempt to take blood, the sample 
might be passed to another practitioner to initiate the request process and label 
the bloods. Further complications or delays occur for an unidentified patient. 
Without the minimum patient core identifiers, practitioners are unable to access 
technical systems and request investigations. To enable the sample to be 
processed a temporary identification number is created. However, once the 
identity of the patient is established unique identifiers e.g. CHI or NHS numbers 
will be used and at some stage the patient may have two numbers. 
 
In the first instantiation the urgency of the context justifies distributing functions 
within the team to allow those with clinical expertise to remain with the patient. 
In outpatients the demand for blood samples, time constraints and physical work 
environment influenced why practitioners distributed the functions.  
Both strategies aimed to positively influence the system’s efficiency where time 
was limited for different reasons. In outpatients the working practices also aimed 
to reduce the risks associated with checking a patient’s information in a 
challenging working environment; where multiple practitioners work with several 
patients in the same workspace with distractions and interruptions. The absence 
of wristbands in this setting combined with time pressures and familiarity with 
patients, highlighted why variability in identify checks may occur. 
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“I think sometimes you see so many patients you just forget (to check). Not 
intentionally, sometimes you think I know this patient. ” 
 
Information 
Three functions: ‘Decide to take blood sample’, ‘Collect relevant information’ and 
‘Complete request process’ influenced the greatest number of other functions 
within the model. The expertise of the practitioner is instrumental to the decision 
and demand for blood samples. Increased demands were predicted as expertise 
fluctuates e.g. during the rotation of foundation year medical staff. 
Accessibility of information was also influential to the reliability and variability 
associated with decision making. The usability of information sources was 
suggested as influential to the efficiency and accuracy with which patient details 
are recorded and the patient is correctly identified.  
Collecting information to complete requests may be pulled from several sources. 
The lack of accessibility, usability and standardisation between clinical settings, 
were reported as influential to the accuracy and efficiency in which information 
can be collected. 
“I have just come back from working in hospital X and each of the group 
and save forms is different and I think that can sometimes causes bits of 
it not to be filled out well” 
 
 
This potential for variability in collecting patient information introduces a greater 
dependency upon later checking to ensure a success. However, observations 
suggested familiarity with patients may impede this check.  
Labelling Blood Samples 
 ‘Labelling the blood sample’ is influenced by seven functions with the potential 
for variability in timing or accuracy. The dependency upon a high number of 
functions creates vulnerability. The quality of labelling determines efficiency and 
safety in management of blood samples. Hand written labels are required for 
samples completed prior to a blood transfusion. Incorrectly labelled samples 
risks a patient receiving incompatible blood components or delaying 
transfusions. Writing neatly on a sample bottle with a non matt, curved surface, 
whilst ensuring all text remains inside boxes approximately 2mm high was 
considered a challenge. This combined with contextual factors such as time 
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pressure, competing work requests and distractions were all cited as influential 
to variability in performance. 
Printing blood sample labels is acceptable for the majority of blood tests. This 
requires access to technical systems, without which practitioners need to adjust 
the sequence of blood sampling functions. Unavailability of these systems were 
reported due to: system maintenance, insufficient numbers in proportion to staff 
working within an area, equipment failure and delayed repairs. Practitioners 
implied the unavailability of technology should not delay obtaining a blood 
sample; delays may consequently impede the transition of a patient, access to 
treatment or discharge from hospital. Subsequently, requests and labels may be 
gathered after a sample is obtained. This suggests the details on the requests 
and labels may not be used to inform the remaining functions associated with 
‘checking identity of patient’. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This pilot study sought to understand why variability in blood sampling 
performance in acute hospital settings can occur. The findings provide insights 
into why practitioners modify their work practices to manage the context and 
environments where blood sampling is required.  
 
Healthcare seeks to identify a ‘cause’ for an accident or incident [5], with the 
practitioner often suggested as the more unpredictable component of the 
system. 
This pilot study has highlighted why variability in practice is likely and is in fact 
the norm, with the potential for both positive and negative outcomes for patient 
safety and accommodating organisational demands.  
An organisation or complex system is a dynamic entity which operates within a 
safety envelope. Gradually everyday work practices or adjustments are made to 
accommodate organisational priorities which will impact the decisions made daily 
by practitioners. The emergence of strategies can introduce ‘drift’ in the way 
work is done [25]. The term ‘Resilience’ or ‘Resilience engineering’ refers to how 
well a system is designed to recognise and respond to such shifts within an 
organisation and the impact on how a system functions. A resilient system would 
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be capable of identifying and adapting to potential vulnerabilities or threats to 
safety without the need for an incident or accident to occur [26]. 
The concept of system resilience is a developing approach which informs a 
Safety-II approach for healthcare to consider as an alternative to improve the 
quality and safety of their systems by ensuring more things can go right [8,27]. 
This assumes variability in human performance is normal but aims to promote 
positive performance variability whilst dampening the negative. 
FRAM has provided a realistic model of blood sampling to understand why 
variability occurs and how the system succeeds through adaptability of 
practitioners and where system resilience can be improved. Four key themes are 
proposed for further consideration to enhance the quality, safety and efficiency 
of blood sampling activities: design, reliability, resources and reporting. 
Design 
Equipment and technology relied upon within environments such as healthcare 
should be informed by the principles of good design [28]. These require 
consideration to the context, task and users to inform on a design which can 
promote usability, safety and efficiency [29]. The FRAM analysis highlighted how 
the function of ‘collect relevant information’ is influential to the accuracy of 
several other core functions. The checking of the identity of the patient is a 
function intended to defend against errors associated with these functions and 
the majority of safety interventions focus upon practitioner behaviour when 
labelling and checking. Evidence relating to improvement strategies for blood 
sampling activities highlights that several interventions in combination can have 
an impact upon reducing WBIT incidents, however, these are rarely maintained 
and a fresh look at the problem has been called for [1, 2]. 
 
There appeared little evidence relevant to the physical design, presentation and 
quality of the equipment and interface design influencing collecting the correct 
information. Hand writing blood sample labels on a curved and small writing 
surface requires physical dexterity. Combined with wearing gloves and high 
levels of distractions highlights how well practitioners do to succeed. 
 
Job design should also be explored further to understand why a difference 
between job roles and WBIT prevalence exists. The characteristics of work 
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activities and control of the timing of these activities may differ between job 
roles predisposing some job roles to performance influencing factors more likely 
to influence blood sampling activities. 
  
Designing to make it easier to do the right thing as often as possible is at the 
heart of Human Factors. This would seem relevant to the design of software 
interfaces, request forms and blood sample bottles, which need to consider when 
and where blood sampling occurs and associated system hazards (e.g. time 
pressure, conflicting work demands), to evaluate the usability of any design and 
ensure risks are As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)[30].  
Standardising through design can influence variability in performance. 
Practitioners are regularly required to rotate around hospitals or move between 
departments. Standardisation of the design of the artefacts that support patient 
safety relevant activities common to any healthcare setting could reduce 
variability in the format that information is presented. 
Reliability 
Healthcare’s reliance upon technology to complete core activities will continue to 
increase. The instantiations captured within the FRAM model highlighted the 
significance of the reliability and availability of technical systems to the sequence 
order and adjustments necessary to complete blood sampling within a required 
time frame. Practitioners will delay, adjust the order or distribute functions 
within a team to ensure blood sampling did not delay patient care. This flexibility 
to adapt to technical failures was highlighted as frequent and necessary to 
manage patient care and work demands within care settings studies.  
The resilience in systems, with increased dependency upon technology, needs to 
consider how to learn, monitor and respond to expected and unexpected failures 
or maintenance. Proactive systems to understand the risks associated with 
failure in technology, effective failure and maintenance reporting systems and 
procurement of user tested systems could benefit healthcare as it has done in 
high reliability industries [31]. This pilot study suggests organisational 
effectiveness and practitioner behaviour will both be influenced by the reliability 
of technology necessary to obtain relevant patient information, complete a 
request and label a blood sample. The ability to anticipate and respond to any 
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fragility in these systems would seem to be essential but as such does not 
appear to be a priority. 
Resources 
The ratio of blood samples obtained compared to competent and confident 
practitioners available to complete them influenced several outputs of the 
functions. 
The variability and potential mismatch between demand and resources was 
reported as influencing the time pressure and work demands for practitioners. 
Practitioners highlighted the need to balance patient safety when completing 
functions with an efficiency to ensure optimal patient care and satisfy 
organisational goals. An organisation may not be able to sustain an ideal ratio, 
however, understanding how to predict and respond to sudden or sustained 
mismatches may enhance resilience. Seasonal fluctuations associated with 
increases in patient caseload and the rotation of junior practitioners were two 
such examples reported as increasing the number of blood samples. A mismatch 
in resources and demand may influence the individual’s cognitive performance 
and compromise the ability to remain engaged with a task, alertness, short term 
memory, attention and motivation levels [24,32,33,34]. The concept of leading 
indicators, where key performance indicators are identified and monitored, are 
used by other industries [31] to proactively identify factors predicted as likely to 
influence performance. Leading indicators aim to build resilience into the system 
with an ability to anticipate, monitor and respond in a planned way rather than 
rely upon frontline staff to absorb variability in the system. 
Monitoring, Reporting and feedback 
Incident reports and near miss data cannot be interrogated to consider how 
internal factors may influence variability in performance e.g. stress, fatigue, 
nutritional levels. There was no evidence to suggest time on duty, time since last 
break and factors associated with fatigue are recorded as standard practice in 
the healthcare settings collecting incidence data [1]. The incident analysis 
process will heavily influence the lessons gained by organisations to inform 
future interventions or strategies to manage safety concerns identified [5].  
Healthcare incident data is limited by seeking a single ‘cause’ or deviation from 
expected practice with little consideration to underlying influences that 
contribute to the outcome recorded [19]. The SEIPs model has informed the 
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analysis of incident data in this pilot study. This has provided a broader systems 
approach to factors recognised as influencing human performance and 
potentially contributing to the outcome recorded. This avoids the assumption 
that a single cause can always be identified and instead seeks to identify factors 
within a healthcare system that did/could contribute to undesirable variability in 
performance.     The practicality of procedures for all work contexts may imply 
that ‘noncompliance’ or adjustments to the procedure is normal to everyday 
work practices. Furthermore, there is no process to capture positive reporting on 
why and how the system succeeds or indicate the success rate of different job 
roles in relation to the frequency of completing an activity. Proactive monitoring 
of performance indicators and observations or reports on everyday work can 
focus an organisation’s attention to how safety is really achieved and where 
safety concerns may emerge. Timing of feedback to practitioners and how 
practically actions can be achieved and evaluated by an organisation to ensure 
an effective response addresses the contributory factors identified is 
instrumental to a positive reporting culture and system resilience [13]. 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
A number of study strengths were apparent. We adopted a holistic Human 
Factors methodological perspective in trying to understand the full range of 
system factors which may influence variability and performance. Similarly we 
also applied the FRAM approach which is particularly suited to understanding 
why things go well in complex socio-technical systems and to address the type 
of safety problem at hand. The multi-professional make-up of the research team 
also provided a broad range of Human Factors, safety science, clinical and 
managerial experience and expertise. 
A number of limitations were apparent. This was a pilot study and as such data 
collection was limited by the time and number of participants recruited for 
interviews and observations. The observations were focused on clinical 
environments reflected by NHS Scotland and within the SHOT 2013 Annual 
report as suggesting greater risk of WBIT [1]. Limitations in the verification of 
the coding of incident data have already been highlighted and require further 
investigation. SEIPs appears to offer codes relevant to the incident data analysed 
here, however, future studies are required to consider its usability for the 
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analysis of all healthcare incident data and the inter and intra reliability of this 
approach.  
It is questionable if any methodological approach can fully specify a work 
process in a complex socio-technical system, so it is likely that system factors of 
interest have yet to be captured. Given the small study scope and the focus on 
NHS Scotland hospitals then we should treat the findings with caution in terms of 
any wider generalisability, however they will still be of interest to the 
international practitioner, policy and research communities. 
CONCLUSION 
This pilot study has proposed a realistic model of blood sampling activities and 
why variability in performance exists. Practitioners may adjust their practice to 
balance patient safety in the context of fluctuating demands and challenging 
work environments and equipment. 
Adopting a Human Factors approach and using the FRAM model has enabled the 
team to better understand how work is really done and why variability exists in a 
complex healthcare environment. The results of the study will be used to 
consider where resilience within the system can be enhanced.  
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